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ABSTRACT
Eric Hobsbawm’s milestone work Bandits is attentive to the rural poor
and situates social banditry within the world of peasant resistance, but
his concepts are surprisingly adaptable to contemporary urban set-
tings. Drawing on Hobsbawm’s conceptualisation of social banditry
and avengers, this article examines the perspective of gangs who
perceive themselves as victims of inequality, poverty and capitalism;
who serve as social actors and security providers for their communities;
andwho at the same time engage in cruelty and high levels of violence
and terror. This qualitative study is based on ﬁeldwork undertaken in
Trinidad and Tobago. Findings show that Hobsbawm’s ﬁgure of the
avenger contributes to a better understanding of the contemporary
modalities of urban violence and helps unpacking and characterise the
ambiguity of the relationship between gangs and local communities.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Eric Hobsbawm’s 1969 milestone work is attentive to the rural poor and situates social
banditry within the world of peasant resistance, but his concepts are surprisingly
adaptable to urban settings. Urban violence represents one of the most signiﬁcant
security challenges for citizens and governments. Security challenges in cities are
complex, and range from organised crime to political and economic unrest. Latin
America and the Caribbean have the highest rates of violence worldwide.1 Many
growing cities in Latin America and the Caribbean are witnessing a sharp escalation
of various forms of urban violence and some cities have lost control of parts of their
territory to non-state violent actors such as street gangs, drug lords or armed groups. By
wielding extra-legal power these groups create a parallel structure of social norms and
law and order. Low-income neighbourhoods often referred to as favelas, barrios, slums,
no go-zones or hot spots are often the arena of urban violence related to criminal gangs.
Gangs commonly occupy these ‘uncontrolled spaces of a “world of slums”’ and have
become ‘permanent ﬁxtures in many ghettos, barrios, and favelas across the globe’.2 The
relationship of gangs and their local communities is an ambiguous one as local
residents face a high level of everyday violence, fear and insecurity, yet a number of
scholars found an intimate relationship based on the provision of protection, social
services, jobs and ﬁnancial support. The relationship between gangs and the community
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within which they operate drew the attention of scholars, resulting in numerous studies
highlighting the fundamental ambiguity of this relationship.3 It is understood that
gangs are frequently intimately related to politics and take over social roles in their
communities. The social roles that gangs take over are not necessarily emerging due to a
void or lack of state presence, but rather in ‘state complicity’4 or in ‘co-existence’5 with
state authority and ‘generating localized systems of order’.6 Thus gangs are not
‘unchangeably violent or terminally hostile’7 but can constitute ‘guarantors of local
security’,8 ‘orders of violence’,9 and ‘recognizable social institutions that obeyed and
imposed codiﬁed rules’,10 employing a system referred to as ‘jungle justice’.11
Brotherton and Barrios ﬁnd that ‘the possibility of gangs emerging with their own
alternative political, economic, or even cultural agenda is never given serious
consideration’.12
Taking the case of urban violence in Trinidad and Tobago, this article sheds light on
the interactive sphere between gangs13 and the community they reign. In Trinidad and
Tobago, a state with 1.3 million inhabitants, the homicide rate increased signiﬁcantly
from 9.5 per 100,000 in 2000 to 41.6 per 100,000 in 2008.14 The national homicide rate
has decreased since then, but remains the world’s sixth-highest (homicide rate 30.9 per
100,000 in 2015).15 While not all murders are gang-related, gangs play a major role in
pushing the level of homicide and violence. A gang war between two major groups,
namely ‘Rasta City’ and the ‘Muslims’, has pushed up the homicide rates and spread
fear. Violence and gang activity is a nationwide phenomenon, yet mainly found on the
island of Trinidad and concentrated in the north-western part of the island where the
capital city Port of Spain is located. More speciﬁcally, violence and gang activity is
concentrated in the area of Laventille and its adjacent neighbourhoods of Morvant,
Beetham and Sealots along the east west corridor, which connects the capital city with
the rest of the island. The Besson Street police station, which is in charge of East Port-of
-Spain and Laventille, accounted for 23.8 per cent of all murders in Trinidad and
Tobago in 2005, pushing the Laventille’s homicide rate to 249 per 100,000 persons.16
The gangs have created unoﬃcial borders for the geographical zones they control and
have restricted freedom of movement for both regular citizens and gang members. The
gangs secure their borders through snipers with high-power assault riﬂes, who are
located at designated observation points. Invisible to outsiders, gang territory begins
close to the capital city’s major shopping street and main bus station. They are also
involved in drug traﬃcking, burglaries, robberies, prostitution, fraud, and extortion
created their own legal companies and non-governmental organisations, receiving
government contracts and dispense jobs related to the social welfare programmes.
Urban violence has caught scholarly attention and poses a preoccupation of
policy-makers, planners and practitioners around the world.17 Within interdisciplin-
ary scholarly literature as well as policy-makers and non-state initiatives, there is a
recurring challenge of how to limit, contain or prevent gang violence. Most com-
monly, public authorities, including police, national security agencies and special
forces, as well as mainstream sociological and criminological studies focus on
youths’ deviant behaviour with a tendency to brand gangs as national security threat
or ‘new urban insurgency’18 or ‘crime and security problem’.19 In this scenario,
states commonly address the issue of gangs by using increasingly punitive measures,
based on the criminalisation of youth and the poor, and a militarisation of public
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space.20 As part of this reactionary discourse, repressive policy responses have
proven to be ineﬀective or even counterproductive in many cases as they push
youth towards more organised forms of criminality.21 Thus, scholars criticise that
gangs are commonly misunderstood feature of urban life.22 Positive activities and
social roles of gangs remain an ‘unappreciated’ aspect in scholarly literature and,
despite numerous case studies, have not ‘found a home in the dominant strands of
criminological thinking about gangs’.23 There is a need for a multifaceted perspec-
tive on gangs, as their sole criminalisation is ‘intellectually dishonest and socio-
logically baseless’.24
This article takes Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of social banditry as a referential
starting point to discuss contemporary modalities of gangs, banditry and violence
in Trinidad and Tobago. The image of the social bandit, most commonly personiﬁed
as Robin Hood, has proven remarkably persistent. The longevity and popularity to
use the concept of Robin Hood is evidenced by several recent studies to explain
contemporary violence and urban gangs.25 Framing the ‘anti-hero’ as Robin Hoods
explains their attachment to society and sheds light on the mechanism that enables
audiences to take the gangs’ side to become complicit with them.26 In a similar
manner, Gutiérrez Rivera argues that the community status of gangs has important
implications: the closer the link between community residents and gangs, the higher
the chances that residents tolerate gang violence.27 While acknowledging the useful-
ness of the concept of Robin Hoods, I ﬁnd that the ﬁgure of Hobsbawm’s avenger
has even greater potential to explain the multifaceted phenomenon of gang violence
as it combines two contradicting perspectives on gangs: as caring social actors and
violent actors or fear and terror at the same time. The conceptual combination of
these contradicting perspectives is a novelty.
Drawing on Hobsbawm’s conceptualisation of avengers, this article examines the
perspective of gangs who perceive themselves as both products and victims of capital-
ism, especially of inequality and poverty, and as social actors and providers for their
communities, and who engage in cruelty and high levels of violence, through which
they create fear. The conceptualisation of Hobsbawm’s avenger is surprisingly adaptable
to contemporary urban settings as it goes beyond the image of the Robin Hood to
explain and characterise the ambiguity of the relationship between gangs and local
communities. To this end the concept of the avenger facilitates a holistic understanding
of gangs, and, to this end, presents alternative viewpoint how to understand and deal
with contemporary urban violence.
The article proceeds in three parts. In the ﬁrst, I outline the role of gangs in local
communities drawing on scholarly ﬁndings from across the world. These ﬁndings, from
political science, sociology and ethnographic studies show the ambiguity of the relation-
ship of gangs and their local communities. I subsequently theorise this ambiguity by
presenting Hobsbawm’s ﬁgure of the avenger and present my methodological approach.
The second part mirrors the narratives of gang leaders and members and local residents
from gang-controlled areas concerning the role of gangs as social actors, security
providers, and defenders of the community against injustice and social neglect. The
third part outlines the character of brutality, cruelty and high levels of violence, through
which gangs create fear.
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Urban violence
Latin America and Caribbean have the highest homicide rate in the world.28 Urban
violence is becoming more widespread in Latin American and Caribbean cities,29
which face a ‘chronic public security crisis’.30 Examining scholars’ ﬁndings across the
world, gangs pose a threat of insecurity and violence, yet the relationship to their
local communities are ambiguous, intimate, symbiotic and based on reciprocal trust,
coercion and compliance. Low-income neighboorhoods, often referred to as favelas,
barrios, slums, no go-zones or hot spots are often the arena of urban violence related
to criminal gangs. According to Rodgers and Baird, the relationship between gangs
and communities is ‘often very strong and highly organized’.31 The relationship of
gangs and their local communities is an ambiguous one as local residents face a high
level of everyday violence, fear and insecurity, yet a number of scholars found an
intimate relationship based on the provision of protection, social services, jobs and
ﬁnancial support. Gangs constitute a real yet misunderstood feature of urban vio-
lence, as they are closely linked to increasing levels of inequality and exclusion in
Central America.32 Inequality and exclusion play a major role in nurturing opinions
to generate legitimacy and support. Griﬃn and Persad observe that ‘un-civil society
groups’ have emerged throughout the Caribbean due to ‘a failure of the state to
deliver on its core functions – providing a consistent set of public goods, including
security, education, care, and basic infrastructure needs’.33 Gangs take the opportu-
nity to provide these services and in turn become legitimated ‘community leaders’34
or even ‘functional equivalents of states’.35 This is in line with what Harriot observes
in Jamaica: the relationship with the community gives the gangs political leverage and
immunity against law enforcement.36 Gang leaders in Jamaica, referred to as dons,
rely on a signiﬁcant level of support of their community members which is based on
the dons’ provision of social security, physical protection and employment and an
‘alternative form of dispensing justice’.37 Dons provide food, school supplies and gifts
and, unsurprisingly explains Jaﬀe, present themselves as ‘benevolent providers and
protectors’.38 Dons perform ‘social and economic welfare roles’ which in turn grants
them authority among community residents.39 Criminal gangs in Jamaica used proﬁts
made through narcotic trade to provide socio-economic services to community
members.40 The roles that dons take over are not necessarily emerging due to a
void or lack of state presence, rather in ‘state complicity’.41 Similarly, Stephenson
analysed the local social order of gangs in Russia and observed that in the 1990s,
gangs turned into ‘agents of patrimonial power, acting as a structure of quasi-familial
welfare and violent regulation’ in their area.42 Local poor residents received ﬁnancial
support, hungry people were handed free potatoes, and play areas for children were
set up.43 The Russian gang leader, as Stephenson describes, invested in halting street
crime and developed good relations to the police. Stephenson noticed a ‘gang’s
penetration into the community’ and a self-perception of gangs themselves as ‘bas-
tions of order and morality’.44 Community members accepted the gangs as violent
social regulators due to a lack of trust in eﬀective state protection and distrust in
institutions of law and order.45 In South-East Asia’s well-known tourist island, Bali,
militia groups contest security and enjoy legitimacy at the local level in reference to
the ‘community in need of protection and its core values’.46 McDonald and Wilson
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argue that the power of Balinese militia rule and their security provision doesn’t
indicate a limitation of state authority due to the strong embedment in the local
Balinese culture and linkages to political sphere.47 The protective role that violent
groups play contributes to an ambiguity in people’s attitudes towards them, as
McIlwaine and Moser observed throughout Latin America.48 Gutiérrez Rivera
found that in the 1990s local communities in Honduras controlled by the gangs
MS and M-18 didn’t perceive them as threats, but as ‘forms of protection, from
burglars, delinquents, and other threats’.49 The 1990 Nicaraguan youth gangs, known
as pandilla, were ‘recognizable social institutions that obeyed and imposed codiﬁed
rules’ as Rodgers explains, and refrained from harming local community residents.50
Gangs have also taken over roles as justice providers by enacting rules, prosecuting
crimes and sentencing according to their own view of life. Blake ﬁnds that gangs in
Jamaica became judge, juror and executor of justice at the same time, employing what
he calls ‘jungle justice’.51 Jungle justice prohibits, for instance, robberies in their own
communities, disrespecting the elderly and sexual abuse of the women living in the
community. This is what Hensell found in the case of street gangs in Albania’s urban
centres. Gangs were in search of public recognition and appreciation, and felt
responsible to maintain law and order against the backdrop of a corrupt and
incapacitating government. They imposed their own rules such urging gang members
to refrain from sexual assaults of women and theft in their communities.52
Yet, many cases around the world indicate the use of violence of gangs as a strategic
means. Siegelberg and Hensell frame social orders which are based on the use or threat
of physical violence excerted by violent groups as ‘order of violence’.53 Blake points out
that Jamaican dons gained signiﬁcant power based on the command of armed gangs
willing to use their guns, which is a ‘means of creating fear and acquiring respect inside
garrisons’.54 In this way gang leaders build a relationship with the residents of their
garrisons based on reciprocal trust: dons provide welfare beneﬁts to community
members who in return aﬀord legitimacy and authority.55 In the case of Honduras,
gangs increased their use of violence to maintain their ‘legitimate community status,’ as
Gutiérrez Rivera observed, by threatening, mugging and extorting residents, non-
residents and taxi and bus drivers.56
Scholarly literature has so far failed to theorise the ambiguity the two faces of gangs:
as caring social actors and as instigators of cruelty and actors of excessive violence and
terror. These examples from all over the world call for a thorough examination of the
relationship, but has not resulted in a conceptualisation thereof. Eric Hobsbawm oﬀers
a means of addressing this contradiction by introducing the character of the avenger.
Although his work on social banditry has been criticised as romanticising crime and as
‘methodologically unsound, theoretically ﬂawed, empirically limited’,57 it stimulates
thinking of gangs as exercising urban social banditry.
The term ‘banditry’ denotes challenging the economic, social and political order by
challenging those power.58 Banditry is thus a phenomenon linked to socio-economic
and political orders, as banditry is enacted by ‘outlaws’ who act outside of public law
and not as law enforcers. In general social bandits are ‘peasant outlaws whom the lord
and state regard as criminals, but who remain within the peasant society, and are
considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, ﬁghters for justice’.59 He
deﬁnes bandits as persons who ‘resist obedience, are outside the range of power, are
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potential exercisers of power themselves, and therefore potential rebels’.60 Bandits thus
voice public discontent in the form of peasant protest and rebellion.
Hobsbawm outlines several types of social bandits, among which are the noble
robber and the avenger. I will brieﬂy introduce the type of a noble robber before I
continue with the avenger. Noble robbers, framed as Robin Hoods, start as ‘victims of
what they and their neighbours feel to be injustice’.61 A noble robber acts as an agent ‘of
justice, indeed a restorer of morality, and often considers himself as such’.62 The role of
a noble robber is that of ‘a champion, the righter of wrongs, the bringer of justice and
social equity’.63 The beginnings of a noble robber are linked to the perception of
injustice, which is an important aspect of gangs as well. Hobsbawm outlines nine
characteristics of noble robbers: noble robbers are (1) engaged in ‘outlawry’ as victims
of injustice, but considered criminals by authorities. A noble robber (2) ‘rights wrongs’
and (3) takes from the rich to provide for the poor. A noble robber (4) only engages in
killings in self-defence and revenge, (5) is attached to his community, and (6) is
‘admired, helped and supported’ by the community. Noble robbers (7) only die if
betrayed, because the community members would not help the authorities against
them, (8) are theoretically ‘invisible and invulnerable’ and (9) do not oppose the highest
political leaders but those who directly oppress them.64
Clearly, noble robbers are portrayed as good, morally just and heroic in nature. In
reality, this one-sided portray is diﬃcult to substantiate, as gang members use violence
strategically to pursue a certain goal. The aspects of revenge and retaliation, terror,
cruelty and indiscriminate brutality seem to be absent in Hobsbawm’s notion of a noble
robber. But he introduces another type of criminal: the avenger. The avenger shares
many characteristics of the noble robber, but in addition ‘avengers’ are not solely
genuine righters of wrongs in the battle against injustice in the name of the oppressed,
but also build their power by creating fear and horror. Hobsbawm cites a poem to shed
light on the image of an avenger:
He killed for play, Out of pure perversity, And gave food to the hungry, With love and
charity.65
The character of the avenger is highly interesting. The avenger combines the positive
aspects of noble robbers with brutality, fear and power: ‘terror and cruelty’ are ‘part of
their public image’.66 Hobsbawm explains that avengers are ‘public monsters’ who
internalise ‘values of the “noble robber”’ and are ‘heroes not in spite of the fear and
horror their actions inspire, but in some ways because of them’.67 Excessive violence
and cruelty are part of the character of an avenger, as they live by love and fear: if their
roles were based only on love, it would be a weakness, and if it were based only on fear,
they would have no supporters. ‘Even the best of bandits must demonstrate that he can
be “terrible”’ and despite, or rather because of, the ‘monstrosities’ they ‘are and remain
the heroes of the local population’.68 Hobsbawm thus highlights the mechanism behind
the use of violence to spread fear. Upholding sexual morality and the punishment of
rapists can be part of being an avenger, though imparting terror is the dominant
attribute. In contrast to the beloved Robin Hoods, ‘(t)o be terrifying and pitiless is a
more important attribute of this bandit than to be the friend of the poor’.69
Hobsbawm’s avenger oﬀers an understanding of contemporary urban violence on
two dimensions: On a macro level, rather than seeing (urban) violence as an indicator
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of a state’s inability to address issues of poverty, racism and exclusion, and link the
benevolent attitude of gangs to a lack of state presence or inadequate state capacity, the
concept of the avenger allows us to analyse the role that violence plays in contemporary
democracies. As Arias has pointed out, gangs can generate popular support and become
‘resistant to state policy interventions’.70 Understanding gangs as avengers can thus
oﬀer valuable insights into the workings of politics, gangs and local communities and
explain why the phenomenon of gangs is persistent over time. On a micro level, viewing
the ambiguity of gangs as part of the processes of socialisation of young men into crime
is also central to understanding why gangs persist. Instead of viewing gang members as
pathological criminals, Hobsbawm’s avenger helps to understand crime as a form of
social protest and underclass revolt while at the same time refraining from romanticis-
ing crime and violence. Acknowledging gang members as victims of social exclusion,
poverty and discrimination can serve as a self-fulﬁlling prophecy for young men,
providing them with a legitimisation for opting for ‘a life of crime.’ But in reality,
this is only one perspective on gangs, as scholar Hagedorn reminds to view gang
members as ‘real people’ who react to ‘conditions of poverty, racism and oppression’
and at the same time urges not to romanticise or underestimate their violent and
destructive potential.71
Allowing Hobsbawm’s concepts to travel to Trinidad calls out for attention to two
aspects that do not ﬁt: the urban setting and gangs as social bandits. In Hobsbawm’s
understanding, social banditry was a rural phenomenon limited to peasant outlaws;
he excludes urban terrorism, gangs or robbers whose motivations were only
economic.72 He argues that rural and urban spheres are too diﬀerent to be discussed
in the same terms and even antagonistic, as ‘peasant bandits, like most peasants,
distrust and hate townsmen’.73 In Hobsbawm’s deﬁnition, gangs are not social
bandits. But Hobsbawm also argues that ‘in a peasant society few can be free’ as
peasants are ‘victims of authority and coercion’ who are oppressed by ‘lordship and
labour’.74 In contemporary terminology, this can be translated to social exclusion,
elitism and corruption, and capitalism. The empirical ﬁndings of this study underline
that Hobsbawm’s concepts are adaptable to today’s urban settings and very useful to
understand socially and economically excluded urban males resorting to violence and
crime.
The following section applies Hobsbawm’s concepts to Trinidad and Tobago as an
analytical framework for understanding the relationship between gangs and their
communities. I furthermore critically examine the data based on interviews with active
gang members as gangs create narratives about themselves, a practice that gang
researcher Brotherton refers to as ‘myth-building’.75 It is important to understand
that the shared narratives are based on gang members self-perception or community
members’ perception of gangs.
Method
This research project is an interdisciplinary, explorative case study. The goal of a case
study is to understand complex social phenomena and ‘retain the holistic and mean-
ingful characteristics of real-life events’.76 In this case study I used qualitative methods
and a grounded theory approach.
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The empirical data was gathered during ﬁeldwork undertaken in Trinidad and
Tobago from March to June 2015. In this study, interviews were conducted with a
variety of persons, including active gang leaders and members. These interview partners
are considered to be hard-to-reach. Researching hard-to-reach populations raises the
question of which sampling technique to apply. Interview partners were selected with
the use of a reﬁned sampling technique, the successive approach.77 It is inﬂuenced by
the logic of snowball sampling and purposive sampling, methodological insights pro-
vided by researchers who have studied hard-to-reach population (e.g. accessibility
diﬃculties, indeﬁnite population), and the particularities of conﬂict environments
(e.g. atmosphere of distrust and suspicion). The ﬁrst step of the successive approach
consists of identifying, mapping, and contacting individuals who work or live with the
target population of interest. This entails purposive sampling, as researchers use their
judgment to identify the individuals they think will provide the best insights. These
individuals are similar to experts with context knowledge and are referred to as
‘periphery persons.’ When sampling periphery persons, it is preferable to generate a
sample with diversity of the roles as the perceptions of the research phenomenon might
diﬀer depending on the person’s role (e.g. whether they are a teacher, religious
representative, or social worker). Thus I mapped out people who were working with
or on gangs in Trinidad and contacted them. The second step of the successive
approach involves contacting members of the hard-to-reach population, in this case
active gang members.
Fieldwork and interviews
Carrying out ﬁeldwork in dangerous settings has various implications, ranging from
sampling and accessing the population of interest, shaping the research agenda, and
formulating strategies on how to manage potential risks. Methodological issues that
impact sampling and interview techniques are, for instance, a lack of accessibility, a lack
of openness due to mistrust or security issues concerning the researcher. When inter-
viewing active criminals, in contrast to former combatants or ex-members, establishing
a rapport and trust with them is paramount; otherwise, the researcher’s well-being is in
jeopardy. Anthropologists, ethnographers, sociologists, and political scientists have all
experienced the challenges of conducting qualitative research and the related hazards in
dangerous settings. The resulting publications thereof have contributed to a growing
body of literature, which covers ‘dangerous ﬁeldwork’,78 ‘danger in the ﬁeld’79 and
‘physical dangers to ﬁeldworkers’.80 Further valuable work based on qualitative gang
research and research in highly violent settings has been published by, among others,
Enrique Desmond Arias, Adam Baird, Luis Barrios, Philippe Bourgeois, David
Brotherton, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jennifer M. Hazen, Dennis Rodgers, Martin Sánchez-
Jankowski, Gaelle Rivard Piché and Sonja Wolf.81
With the use of the successive approach qualitative, semi-structured interviews and
background talks with 39 persons were conducted. Interview partners included active
leaders or members of gangs; former gang members, released prisoners, as well as
teachers, social workers, youth workers, a pastor, a priest and an imam, youth church
groups, musicians, regular community residents from gang-controlled areas, steelband
players, former prison oﬃcers, police oﬃcers and special police unit oﬃcers. In
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addition, I had oﬀ-the-record conversations with 18 persons (14 men; four women),
including two former gang members. Additionally, I took part in several events in gang-
controlled areas such as community meetings, walkabouts, bible study meetings, etc.
and visited a maximum-security prison. The interviews were recorded, transcribed with
the computer programme F5 and coded openly and analysed with the help of the
computer programme Atlas.ti.
Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago: caring defenders of the community
The ﬁrst violent groups emerged in the area of Laventille, an area with a long and
complex history of violence. Laventille is the area of origin of the steel pan music. The
steelband era was marked by outbursts of violence and street ﬁghts, underlining the
argument that it ‘always had gang violence in Trinidad’.82 Fights between steelbands
ﬂourished in the 1950s that took place in the streets, backyards and alleyways at any
point in time.83 In the 1980s the youth of Laventille was easy prey for the mobilisation
eﬀorts of an Islamic organisation named Jamaat al Muslimeen. In the late 1980s an
increasing number of youth joined under the wing of the Jamaat al Muslimeen, which
went from an Islamic community organisation to ‘social bandits’ to the providers of
guns and protectors of the drug trade as ‘Allah’s outlaws’.84 After the attempted coup
d’état in July 1990, the Jamaat al Muslimeen withdrew oﬃcially from their activities in
Laventille and gradually lost control to individual kingpins. The following decade in the
mid-2000s was marked by a ﬁerce competition between persons who sought to become
the next powerful gang leader. The competition eventually led to the consolidation of
the two factions around 2008–2012, ‘the Muslims’ and their counterforce ‘Rasta City’,
who split up vast gang territory among themselves. ‘Rasta City’ and ‘the Muslims’ have
hence become umbrella groups with a hierarchical leadership and tremendous
inﬂuence.
In Trinidad and Tobago, gangs’ power is bolstered by their social role as defenders
and voicers of public discontent in their community. According to my interviewees,
gang members perceive themselves as victims of a political system ruled by greedy,
power-hungry and corrupt politicians in their country, as well as victims of global
mechanisms of inequality where capitalist countries and ‘black-minded’ world leaders
enrich themselves at the expenses of the rest. This self-perception as deprived victims
has become a convenient life motto which they live up to. According to this mindset,
the gang members’ actions are a response to the status quo; they are the freedom
ﬁghters of the oppressed and the Robin Hoods of the poor, under the ﬂag of anti-
capitalism and equality.
We are defending ourselves. They provoke everyday, we can’t take that.85
Through the lens of Hobsbawm this mindset is part of a noble robber who ‘never kills
but in self-defence or just revenge’.86 The gang members and leaders interviewed
emphasised their frustration and disappointment to justify their actions. They based
their criticism on global issues such as world domination, capitalism, and imperialism,
as well as on local issues such as corrupt and unaccountable politicians. The perception
of injustice can be traced back to the country’s resource wealth, which is not shared
equally among the country’s citizens but remains in the hands of a few. A leader of
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Rasta City explained that Trinidad and Tobago is a rich country, but that the wealth is
not distributed equally. Therefore, not everybody proﬁts from the country’s oil. While
certain segments of the society live in aﬄuence, others are deprived of basic needs such
as sanitary infrastructure. The gang leader recounted how he grew up in Laventille’s
widespread poverty and accused rich Trinidadians of stealing from society to ‘get
themselves rich’, stating that ‘the rich people need to share some of the money’.87
We live here in Laventille and we still have people living without toilets, [they only have] shit
holes, latrines [. . .] plenty latrines around here. And now the government come try to ﬁx it, but
they could have done it long time ago, but they hold on to the money. You know they thief
[steal]! Everybody thieving this country! I really don’t know what they are doing with the
money, I can’t say. All I know they [their] house big, and the family have everything.88
Another gang leader from Beetham Gardens stated that theoretically there is enough
work for every citizen in Trinidad and Tobago. He argued that certain parts of the
society are purposefully kept in dependency in order to control them, stating that the
economic deprivation is a purposefully orchestrated move to ‘keep the people poor’ in
order to facilitate politicians’ own social mobility who live on the expense of the
population.89 The gang leader’s statement is a clear example of how well Hobsbawm’s
peasant society resembles the contemporary urban poor: ‘in a peasant society few can be
free’ as peasants are ‘victims of authority and coercion’ who are oppressed by ‘lordship
and labour’.90
Voting, the gang leader continued, the means to enforce political change, is ‘all
lies’.91 Another gang member felt that the government of Trinidad and Tobago must
proﬁt in some way from the ongoing violence, since it is not doing what is necessary to
stop it. In his view, the violence between the two rival gangs Rasta City and the Muslims
could easily be solved, but ‘the government like [sic] the crime’.92 According to a gang
leader’s perception, crime could be easily contained because it is a product of poverty.
Less poverty would mean less crime, so the gang member called for proper education,
enough food and decent work for the people in order to enable them to leave the life of
crime.93 According to regular community members living in Laventille as well as gang
members election promises are not being delivered. This perception of political neglect
is framed as the reason for the problems in the communities. Places like Laventille ‘have
lots of love’ but the violence and killings take place because of the political neglect, as a
gang leader from Beetham Gardens explained:
With the violence and the killings [. . .] it have this kind of way [. . .] but it come down to one thing:
The political ﬁgures in the country is not dealing with we [us]! And that’s what’s going on.94
Statements made by gang leaders show traits of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, as
evident in one interviewee’s comments. He criticised the lack of legitimacy of ‘world
leaders’, asking ‘who give them the power to dominate the world?’ He also stated that
some local politicians don’t have Trinidad and Tobago but rather the ‘dollar sign’ in
their hearts. In interviewed gang members’ own perception, their communities are the
victims of world dominance, and ‘evil men’ who keep the people purposefully blinded,
trembling and ﬁghting rule the world. He argued that the voices of the people are only
heard when they become violent.95 He accused the ‘world leaders’ of ‘lock[ing] the
world resources’ in order to be able to control the people. To this end, he touched on
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the issue of a revolution, as ‘people are fed up’ and ready to claim their share. Another
leader from the hills of Laventille put the existence of gangs into perspective. He argued
that there are poor people in every society of the world, the ‘have and the have-nots’,
and that the poorest people of society take up their arms as a struggle for survival.96 He
made implicit references to the evident inequality in his country:
Poor men have no plane, poor men have no villa, but they have guns and struggle for survival.97
An elderly resident from Beetham supports this perspective:
The wealth trickle down [. . .] although we are a oil-producing country, gas-producing
country, the oil and gas money, it will ﬁlter down to us. The Trinidadian government
cream oﬀ a large amount and then they trickle down some [money] to the middle class and
then the crumbs to us. Everybody keep grabbing.98
The perception of injustice incorporates the argument that violence is a means of self-
defence. Therefore, gangs oﬀer the service of protection, often framed as self-defence
against enemy gangs. Reportedly, the community has to stand up against the destruction
of property and robberies of jewellery. Violent actions thus become a reaction to
provocations, crime and violence, a perspective which frames those carrying out this
violence as the victims rather than perpetrators. A gang member described this as follows:
And the people from up there [neighbourhood called Block8] coming down here [St. Paul
Street], they break the place, they take people[’s] gold, that start a lot of war, nah! So now
people in the community now stand up against that. These people have no respect for
nobody. They come here, they break my mother’s place, they break your mother’s place.
They take my chain [necklace], they take your chain, and go back over. They come and do
that. They come and take whatever, they don’t care. We are defending ourselves.99
The gang members legitimate violence by vengeance, and Hobsbawm explains that for
avengers ‘cruelty is inseparable from vengeance, and vengeance is an entirely legitimate
activity for the noblest of bandits’.100
The position of a gang leader is referred to as a community leader and involves
responsibilities, including the provision of protection for the community.101 Therefore,
only persons who appear eligible may hold this respected position:
Nobody perfect, everybody has good and bad. But here you have to defend yourself, you
understand? And as a leader, you have to defend the community. But other people don’t
understand that. They just want to see it their way, just say ‘ah he killing people.102
There are accounts of gangs as law enforcers and crime prosecutors and how they ‘don’t
tolerate’ crimes in their communities, which has led to communities with few incidents
of ‘snatching’ (stealing of valuables).103 When gangs engage in ‘law enforcement’ they
refer to their own rules, regulations, and punishments. In Hobsbawm’s vocabulary, they
‘right wrongs’.104 Protecting their community means ensuring that community mem-
bers aren’t robbed of their valuables (‘snatching’), physically hurt or sexually assaulted.
According to gang members’ own accounts, their chances of ﬁnding the thieves or
perpetrators of crime in their respective community are high.105 A steel band manager
who grew up in one of the most violent parts of town reported that perpetrators of
crime could be killed by gang leaders for their oﬀences:
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A young fella in the community who snatching chains [stealing necklaces] and doing that
kind of things, he could get killed by a gang leader. The gang leader will get one of his boys to
take him out [kill him].106
Besides prosecuting the crime, the leader also acts as the judge for punishments, which
apparently range from no repercussions, to beatings, to death for rapists. The punish-
ment depends on the severity of the crime, or the gang leader’s mood, as one leader
explained:
Sometimes I beat them up, but not this time. But rapists get killed.107
Hobsbawm’s avenger also perceives themselves as ‘upholders of sexual morality’; ban-
dits were forbidden to rape and seducers faced castration.108
That the gangs have grown into social actors is apparent in the services they provide.
In providing these services, the gangs have seized an important role within their
communities, as a resident from gang-controlled Duncan Street in East Port of Spain
claimed. He thinks that the groups have ‘ﬁlled the void’ left by the leaders of society.
So the void and the gap that has been left, somebody will ﬁll it! And right now the person
who is ﬁlling the void that the leaders of society and politicians have left in these areas, are
the gangsters! The head of the gang is ﬁlling it by giving people money for foods, clothes [. . .]
at the end of the day when people leave the church they go home hungry without money and
the gangster might give them food and money! What do you want people to do? This is the
reality!109
The gangs provide what would be considered social welfare to the poor and ﬁnancially
deprived people. To gather deeper insights into the roles of gangs I asked a person from
the Citizen Security Programme, who has also been working as a social worker with
underprivileged youth in Trinidad and Tobago for years, if the gangs in Trinidad were
indeed informal support systems. He answered:
Deﬁnitely. They take over ﬁnancial roles. They assist single mothers with groceries and assist
the kids going to schools, buying uniforms, buying books and so on.110
In this way, Trinidad’s gangs have managed to take hold of an important niche between
the community and the state as providers for the community. A leader of Rasta City
explained that helping poor people and providing food for hungry people is his joy. He
also explained that he is working on getting a teacher with lots of patience for the slow
learners to give them a chance to succeed academically. Besides organising classes for
the slow learners, he wants cooking classes in the community centre. He also wants the
police to assist him in getting the youth out of the ‘life of crime’.111 Benevolently he
claimed that in times when he has no money himself he sells his jewellery in order to be
able to send people to the doctor.112 Yet, an elderly resident from the Beetham stated
that the gangs ‘cream oﬀ’ the lucrative proﬁts made, leaving little to trickle down to the
poor people of the area.113
While some reports on the positive role are self-ascribed attributes from gang
members themselves, there were several occasions that exempliﬁed their positive role
to me as an observer. For instance the proclaimed role of gang leaders as protectors and
crime prosecutors was also exempliﬁed when a young woman interrupted my interview
that I conducted at that time with a number of gang members. Tearing up she told the
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gang leader that her necklace has just been snatched (stolen), an incident which left
visible bleeding scratches on her neckline. The gang leader sent out his soldiers to ask
around and dig up the thieves while he reassured me that the chances of ﬁnding the
thieves are high, while ‘the police has no chance’.114 They found the thieves in less than
one hour.
The question of gangs as providers of security remains an ambiguous one. When I
interviewed a mother of two who lives in the gang-controlled area called Beetham
Gardens, she took a critical stand against the gang culture in her community in general,
but argued that it has become safer within her own community, Beetham. She compared
the community of Beetham to a ‘social club’ she is a member of, and members are
provided with protection.
But despite all the negative it also have a positive. In this community [Beetham] you are gonna
be taken care of! You are safe. So my family members from Beetham. But if you are a stranger,
they [gangs] are going to look at you and wanting to know who you are, what community you
come from, you understand, that kind of thing? So now it’s like a social club, like you belong to
a certain club and once you are a member of that club, you are invited.115
A few days later I interviewed an elderly resident in the community of Beetham. I asked
him if the Beetham gangs provide anything positive to the community. He said:
Indirectly, yeah. They tell you ‘we have to protect all you’ but that’s about it!116
Gangs as actors of violence, terror and fear
Eric Hobsbawm explains that ‘avengers’ are not solely genuine righters of wrongs in the
battle against injustice in the name of the oppressed but also build their power by creating
fear and horror. The following section highlights the excessive violence and cruelty are part
of the character of an avenger who live by love and fear and whose dominant attribute it
imparting terror. Hobsbawm argues that bandits, in this case gangsters, must demonstrate
that they can be ‘terrible’ to remain the heroes of the local population.117
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, gangs have succeeded in manifesting themselves
as indispensable actors in society through the eﬀective threat of violence and the
proliferation of fear and terror. A community activist pointed out that the groups in
Trinidad can be ‘vicious’, ‘morbid’ and ‘monsters’.118 Reportedly gang began to use
violence strategically to maintain power and respect when they ‘got smart’ and under-
stood the eﬀectiveness of threats.119 The level of violence in connection to gangs in
Trinidad and Tobago is indeed very high. Shootings and drive-by shootings are the
most common form of violence carried out by gangs in Trinidad and Tobago.120 Gangs
in Trinidad and Tobago have access to weapons ranging from pistols, riﬂes, rudimen-
tary arms (crude guns made by artisans) and shotguns to fully automatic shotguns,
semi-automatic riﬂes, sub-machine guns and assault riﬂes.121 The availability of arms,
facilitated by the Jamaat al Muslimeen in the 1980s, established a mechanism which
tremendously inﬂuenced gangs’ increase in power: the youth realised ‘the power of the
gun’, which brought them respect and fear.122
And let people realize the power of the gun. Let the youth control guns and realize what guns
can do. How people respect them with guns.123
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The groups institutionalised the strategic use of threats of violence for their own beneﬁt,
as they realised that ‘everybody is afraid of death’.124 One reason why gangs opt for
brutality is to cement their position and ‘prove their mark’ in the community, as a
mother from Beetham Gardens observed.125 Interview partners reported that the
security situation has deteriorated to such an extent that political leaders are afraid to
go into areas such as Laventille.126 The symbiotic give and take of political patronage
has thus shifted to a gridlock in which politicians have no choice but to deal with the
gangs. To this end, gangs have made themselves ‘an indispensable component of
campaigning’ through threats and the use of violence.127 Besides drug traﬃcking, the
gangs in Trinidad depend on government contracts and social work programmes
(Community-Based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Programme (CEPEP)
and the Unemployment Relief Programme (URP)) as resources. This source of income is
ﬁercely defended. Police oﬃcers stated that the elimination of these social programmes
would mean ‘revolts and violence’.128 This is in line with what a resident from Beetham
Gardens observed:
[The gangs] control the ‘ten days’, CEPEP and URP. They control that. Within any
government. Because all of them fear violence. So we are in a dread situation.129
Oﬃcers from the Besson Street police pointed out the paradox of handing out contracts
and social work programmes to gang leaders, which enable them to ﬁnance the
purchase of arms:
The government hands them [gangs] a million-dollar project and they use the money to buy
expensive guns that they use against us!130
The gangs use violence strategically to maintain power and respect, a typical character-
istic of Hobsbawm’s avenger who are ‘exerters of power’.131 Gangs have become
powerful and indispensable actors in their communities, and the politicians, as well
as non-state agencies, have ‘virtually sold out to the gangs because of fear’.132
Reportedly, fear and terror is what they use to bargain with the government. When
they want to inﬂict pain or send a message, they ‘drop some bodies’.133 According to
interview partners, gangs use the threat of violence to push politicians to pay attention
to them, and at times ‘have them see a skeleton’ to remind them of their power.134 They
thus ensure they are not overlooked, and simultaneously underscore their ‘importance’
in their respective communities. As a Beetham resident explained:
The only way how poor people get anything is by rebellion. By the time they [the politicians]
see the rebellion, they have full respect for that.135
The violent potential of the groups in Trinidad is evidenced by a number of circum-
stances. One is the geographic location of their turf areas. The areas of Laventille,
Beetham and Sealots that are controlled by gangs in Trinidad happen to be strategically
located on the capital’s main artery: the main highway and bus priority route that leads
in and out of Port of Spain. This East–West corridor connects the capital city with the
international airport and the rest of the island to the east. It is of high importance for
getting in and out of the capital city, and a roadblock could cut oﬀ the city from the rest
of the country. A community police oﬃcer of the Hearts and Minds Unit pointed out:
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What they [gangs] doing is not the ultimate for them, they just doing enough to show the
government: ‘I could give you more trouble than you could handle’. They could start shooting
people in the traﬃc.136
The Hearts and Minds police oﬃcers took me to an area called Beverly Hills in
Laventille and pointed out the countless bullet holes in a building. The oﬃcers
explained that a way gangs show their power is to terrorise the (rival) communities
through random shootings. The intention is to let the other rival groups know what
kind of weapons they have. Pistols, revolvers and shotguns are usually single-shot
weapons and sound much diﬀerent from semi-automatic riﬂes and sub-machine
guns. Once a group gets hold of a new kind of weapon, they shoot it into the air or
randomly into the rival community to show oﬀ their new assets. He claimed that it has
become ‘like a game for them’ to show oﬀ their weapons by shooting into the air.137
What happens is that they will go to one area and just shoot down into the rival area hoping
that it would hit someone. [. . .] It’s like a game for them. So when they do that, the other side
will do the same thing. They are so far away, they can’t see each other! Just ﬁring into the
community.138
These shootings impact regular residents in the communities who are not involved in
the ongoing gang war. The fear of becoming a victim of random shootings impacts the
social life of Trinidadian citizens:
Gangsterism has now become a culture of the people! [. . .] now people can’t go out so much
again because at anytime people can start shooting without any notice. They start to shoot
and who they shooting? At anybody they see!139
For the public, many killings seem random, something which is terrifying for the local
population. In Hobsbawm’s vocabulary, gangs as avengers practice terror to successfully
exert power. In May 2015 a man was shot from long range by a sniper for ‘target
practice’, as the police assumed.140 The indiscriminate violence has a distinct purpose
for gangs ﬁghting a war with rival gangs. Gangs in Trinidad either plan to kill a person
of interest, or they plan to kill an innocent person. This means the killings of innocent
persons are not as random as they seem. A community activist who has been working
with youth in Laventille for decades and joined the Hearts and Minds Unit, a special
community police unit formed to improve relationship between the police and the
communities, explained:
They [gangs] don’t do random. If they are coming to shoot you, they shooting you. If they are
shooting innocent people, they are shooting innocent people. Whoever pick up, pick up.141
Interviewees stated a perverted logic behind the killings of innocent people. In these
cases, the fatal violence against community members, such as mothers and children, is
designed to hurt the whole community. The killing of a criminal or member of a gang
wouldn’t cause much pain in a community as everybody expected this to happen sooner
or later, but the killing of an innocent person is a purposeful strategy to cause pain to a
whole community.142
And they purposefully kill innocent people because it creates terror in the community.
Because of that they are not safe, not safe at all.143
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For instance, on New Year’s Day (1 January) 2016, a 6-year-old boy and a 69-year-old
woman were shot dead on the Beetham.144 It was the start of a new wave of violence
between the rival groups involving several murders, including the execution of two
school boys (17 and 15 years old) who were dragged out of a taxi on their way home
from school and shot on the spot in front of their friends and siblings.145 Another
example of gangs’ terror is provided by the killing of Tecia Henry in 2009. The 10-year-
old girl from John John in Laventille became a victim of the ongoing war between rival
gangs when she went out to a shop but never returned. Later her body was found half
naked, and the cause of death was determined to be strangulation. This was a turning
point for the community, as after this incident the residents of John John stood up
against the gang violence and proclaimed the ‘Tecia Henry Order’, which included a
ceaseﬁre. The Tecia Henry Order is prominently displayed on a billboard in John John
and reads:
Peace among all John John and neighbouring gangs. [. . .] Gang leaders must discipline their
own members for the order to live. No child is to be used to do anything illegal or wrong. No
child is to be kidnapped, hurt or murdered because of gang warfare. There must be absolutely
no disrespecting of the elderly. Innocent residents must never become targets of gang rivalry.
No violence against service providers, goods trucks and taxi drivers. There must be no house-
breaking whatsoever. Raping is a violation of the Order, and must be dealt with seriously.
Absolutely no violence during community activities. No brandishing of guns and injecting of
fear into residents or visitors and if a misunderstanding occurs seek third-party help before
war. We Live The Order.146
This pamphlet does not criticise gang rule in general, but appeals to the gang leaders to
discipline their members. It spells out the terror that community members face,
including abuse, the kidnapping and murder of children, rape and indiscriminate
violence against innocent residents. This indicates that gangs resemble Hobsbawm’s
avenger, as gangs are ‘public monsters’ that exert power and remain heroes of the
population despite their monstrosities, or because of them, as Hobsbawm argues.
Conclusion
Drawing on Hobsbawm’s conceptualisation of avengers, this analysis has demonstrated
that on the one hand, gangs in Trinidad and Tobago have taken over a prominent role
as legitimate community actors. From the perspective of gang leaders and members, the
gangs and their communities are the victims of inequality, elite corruption and capit-
alism. Unaccountable politicians, corrupt law enforcers and a weak justice system
contribute to this perception. The rebellion formulated by the gang leaders interviewed
here is reminiscent of Hobsbawm’s peasant wars, yet is found in the midst of an urban
setting. Gangs have grown into important service providers, a theoretical phenomenon
explained by Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandits’. The interviews with gang leaders demon-
strate their claim to be ‘helping poor people and providing food for hungry people’,
through which they present themselves as Robin Hoods – or noble robbers, to use
Hobsbawm’s term. They act as the community protectors who defend the communities
from outside threats; prosecute crimes; and provide food, money and clothes. The
prosecution of crimes, including upholding ‘sexual morality’ by punishing rapists, can
be linked to Hobsbawm’s avengers.
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On the other hand, gangs engage in high levels of violence, shootings and strategic
killings to terrorise communities, regular citizens and politicians. They have access to
high-power assault riﬂes and kill strategically or randomly, including children and
regular citizens. Community members face abuse, the kidnapping and murder of
children, rape and indiscriminate violence against innocent residents. By spreading
violence and fear, the gangs have established a system of impunity, spurring the
reproduction cycle of gangs. Most murders are not prosecuted due to a lack of evidence
and a lack of witnesses. By acting as ‘avengers’, the gangs have managed to install a
system of local support, impunity and power.
My ﬁndings support previous scholarly ﬁndings that gangs provide social welfare,
protection and justice (e.g. Blake, Harriot and Jaﬀe on gangs in Jamaica,147 Stephenson
in Russia,148 McDonalds and Wilson in Indonesia,149 or Gutiérrez Rivera in
Honduras150). Scholars argue that gangs’ social behaviour grants them authority,
respect and community support. Yet my ﬁndings show that it is not the positive aspect
of gangs itself, but in combination with the spread of terror and fear that puts
community members into a gridlock of compliance. The characteristics of
Hobsbawm’s ‘avengers’ provide a basis for thinking about the relationship of bandits
to the community they reign in. It contributes to a better understanding of the
contemporary modalities of urban violence and his ﬁgure of the avenger is very helps
unpacking and characterise the ambiguity of the relationship between gangs and local
communities. Rather than seeing (urban) violence as an indicator of a state’s inability to
address issues of poverty, racism and exclusion, and link the benevolent attitude of
gangs to a lack of state presence or inadequate state capacity, the concept of the avenger
allows us to explain why the phenomenon of gangs is persistent over time. Viewing the
ambiguity of gangs as part of the processes of socialisation of young men into crime is
central to understanding why gangs persist. These ﬁndings support the assumption that
repressive responses to gang violence are likely to be ineﬀective or counterproductive,
as it neglects that gangs are more than a ‘crime problem’, but social actors providing for
the community who are helped, supported and admired by many. It is a mechanism in
which gangs manage to pull community member on the side of the ‘outlaws’ and
become complicit with them. Instead of viewing gang members as pathological crim-
inals, Hobsbawm’s avenger helps to understand crime as a form of social protest and
underclass revolt and thus oﬀer valuable insights into the workings of politics, gangs
and local communities. At the same time, the concept of avengers is less romanticising
and idolising than Hobsbawm’s Robin Hood, as it points out to the brutality, terror and
fear gang build their power on. This understanding supports the view not to under-
estimate the power of gangs.
Moreover, empirical evidence from Trinidad and Tobago shows that Hobsbawm’s
concepts are more contemporary than the critical literature suggests. Yet to make
Hobsbawm’s 1969 work applicable in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, one has to indulge
in conceptual cherry-picking. The empirical ﬁndings presented here match what
Hobsbawm framed as social bandits and avengers; however, in Hobsbawm’s under-
standing, social banditry was a rural phenomenon limited to peasant outlaws. It
excluded urban terrorism and gangs. If we put Hobsbawm’s lords, peasants, and
countless examples of nineteenth-century bandits aside, we see that social bandits are
indeed applicable to contemporary ﬁndings. If there has been a rural–urban shift of
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violence151 and a transformation of gangs from economically driven criminal collectives
to social actors and legitimised community leaders,152 then the low-income urban
working class is the new peasantry, and the gangs their peasant outlaws.
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